25/26赛季对米兰球迷来说喜忧参半，喜的是球队在阿莱格里的带领下再度回归争四集团，有希望参加下赛季欧冠联赛，忧的是锋线人员众多，却没有一个能拿得出手的得分机器，3月1日至今5名前锋只有1球进账。

1、米兰体育 首先看一下小组形势。

对一家芯片设备企业，这几乎是在最要命的地方下刀。米兰体育阿莫林认为，丘库埃泽不仅可以作为双前腰之一出战，还可以充当边翼卫的轮换人选，与萨勒马克尔斯形成左右换位，本次训练课他就是作为边翼卫首发出战。

2、两个“战场” 一生忠诚——百岁老兵刘景松的世纪人生

最理想的情况是租借到一支中下游意甲球队锻炼，这样可以确保更多出场时间。

3、全新七座方盒子SUV上市！不足15万起，外观很硬朗，搭载2.0T四驱

阵型主打4-3-3控球体系。

4、10分钟腹部燃脂跟练，甩掉腰腹、大腿多余脂肪、全身紧致看得见

碳酸锂从6万到20万再回15万的轨迹，不是又一个周期的简单起落，而是供需在成熟市场中寻找理性均衡，其间也夹杂着市场情绪的潮汐。

5、穆帅、皇马和AC米兰争抢40岁莫德里奇，2家俱乐部提供非球员OFFER

（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

在那里，他度过了职业生涯的大部分时光，在巴塞罗那书写了属于自己的传奇。

“我们的定位一直是给创作者赋能，我们只做工具，不做内容。

6、迎战台风“红霞” 广东245座水库预泄腾库严阵以待

” 谈及在拉玛西亚的岁月，埃斯帕特感慨万千。

豆包走的是一条“模拟点击”的路径，通过无障碍服务读取App内部的标签结构，再利用模拟触控功能自主操作App。

7、英超本赛季落选最佳的伊劳拉选择：从伯恩茅斯奇迹到米兰重建核心

科斯蒂奇2007年出生于黑山，2025年夏窗以90万欧元的价格加盟贝尔格莱德游击。

基于此，vivago R1的产品形态已经接近“AI原生内容生产工作流”，而非单纯的视频生成工具。

8、口出狂言却沦为笑柄！胆怯又玻璃心，脆弱心理制约张本智和发展

一个典型的AI数据中心，单机柜功耗已从传统数据中心的5至8kW飙升至40至100kW，而电网接入审批和扩容周期动辄3至5年。

更令人玩味的是，温契奇与阿根廷队之间还有一段“不解之缘”。

直接参与26球，每73分钟一次。

9、年内第四任主帅，礼彬回归首秀！长春喜都1-1青岛红狮，7轮不胜

只有当 AI 生成的模型足够可打印、可装配、可使用，它才会变成下一次启动机器的理由。

" 萨利巴在法国队的八场世界杯比赛中首发了六场，仅缺席了小组赛末轮对挪威和三四名决赛对英格兰。

10、​马竞夏窗财政吃紧，巴萨静待阿尔瓦雷斯转会迎转机

这种“账面盈利、现金流紧张”的矛盾状态，也解释了市场的疑惑：公司资产负债率仅30%左右，财务结构看似十分稳健，为何在2026年初仍通过H股配售与可转债募资58亿港元？核心原因并非债务压力，而是公司同步推进格林布什三期扩建、江苏张家港氢氧化锂工厂、四川雅江措拉锂矿三大巨型项目，持续的资本开支不断消耗公司存量现金。

这让热刺变得完全无法预测。

1、被理解究竟是一种什么感觉？很多人一辈子都没体验过

此后一路下滑，最后只剩每月10万元左右。

2、徐州地铁4号线再传新进展！

更夸张的是投资方阵容，翻开历轮融资公开名单： 国资背景有中金资本、建投投资、上海半导体产投基金等； 产业资本有华为哈勃、北汽产投、伊利健瓴资本、万向钱潮； 跨境资本有新加坡狮城资本、中国-比利时基金； 市场化投资机构有达晨财智、华控基金、复星锐正、普华资本…… "四类资本全覆盖，这种股东结构在AI初创里绝对是顶级配置"，一位硬科技投资人评价道。

3、“高碳水”竟然成赢家？最新Aging Cell：四周时间提高碳水、降低脂肪，能在短期内让身体的“生理年龄”指标变得更年轻

全展期还将举办 2026 国际低空经济博览会航拍大赛、无人机模拟飞行操控技能大赛、"城翼杯" 职业技能竞赛等赛事。“假户口簿”换真拘留！为娃择校买假证，糊涂家长被拘10日2025年非洲杯冠军的归属依然在申诉之中…… 在2026年世界杯的赛场上，马内迎来了他在国家队的“最后一舞”。

4、市基层理论骨干学习贯彻习近平党建思想专题培训班举办

马特塔身体硬朗，禁区对抗和做球能力突出，在英超已经连续两个赛季稳定输出，属于拿来就能用的即战力。

5、千亿雪松落幕：前广州首富张劲被判无期徒刑

他在边路的突破与终结展现了极高的战术价值，这粒锁定胜局的进球更是其金球奖级别实力的完美体现。

6、领航新消费 “食在杭州　嗨动一夏”音乐美食嘉年华滨江站开幕

2026财年下半年，东方甄选的净溢利预计达到了2.81-3.11亿元，相较2025财年下半年，同比增长了172.8%至201.9%。

“有时候直播间可能有券，会便宜一点。

博洛尼亚CEO费努奇已经公开表态，球队已向球员承诺，只要后续出现合适报价就会允许他离队。

7、英格兰VS阿根廷前瞻：梅西首次面对三狮军团，能否进军决赛？

阿根廷占据64%的控球率，射门15次，更是英格兰的3倍，其中5次射正，而英格兰仅有2次射正，阿根廷更加勇敢，潘帕斯雄鹰配得上晋级决赛，而三狮军团沦为“三喵”，只守不攻，最终败北。

从2014年的遗憾落泪，到2022年的圆梦狂欢，再到2026年的不屈冲锋，他跨越了岁月的鸿沟，打破了物理的规律，梅西21球12助，独揽世界杯历史射手榜+助攻榜。

8、猫屎咖啡控股：主要股东出售约24.2%公司股份

替补登场对沙特，他进球了，但被VAR吹掉——毫厘之间的越位。

Gamma决定行情越走越快时，期权能不能跟着加速。

同时，申凯希透露，也正在开发由本地团队主导的全新零售概念，并将在未来六个月推向市场。

图：应用概览 然而，6月，北交所向旭阳新材发出了二轮问询函，重点关注业绩增长可持续性、销售收入真实性、流动性风险、生产经营合规性等。